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THE JURY AND THE NAMND: SOME OBSERVATIONS
ON JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LAY TRIERS IN CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND SWEDEN*
Ruth Ginsburgt
Participation of laymen in the trial and decision of civil as well as
criminal actions has been a traditional aspect of the legal process in both
Sweden and the United States. Under the common law jury system pre-
vailing in the United States the adjudicative function is divided between
the judge and twelve lay triers. In general, questions of law fall within
the province of the judge, while exclusive competence to determine the
facts is reserved to the jury., Jurors are chosen at random from among
the varied social and economic groups of the community and seldom
serve more than two to three weeks in any one year. They deliberate
in camera, announcing in open court only the ultimate result of their
deliberations. By contrast, the body of lay triers in Sweden, known
as the niimnd, shares with the professional judge, the function of deter-
mining all questions presented, whether of fact or law. Chosen for
six year terms by the local representative councils from among the local
citizenry, nimndemdn sit in panels of seven to nine members and gener-
ally serve at two one-day sessions each month. Deliberating together
with the presiding judge, nnimndeman cast a collective vote on all issues
presented for decision.
In both countries, before the democratization of political processes,
lay service on judicial tribunals satisfied yeoman desires for protection
against judges appointed by and susceptible to the pressures of a
sovereign executive.2 However, the advent of representative government
* This paper was presented at the Sixth International Congress of Comparative Law of
the International Academy of Comparative Law meeting in Hamburg, Germany, August,
1962.
t A.B., Cornell University, 1954; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1959; Member of the New
York Bar; Associate Director, Columbia Law School Project on International Procedure.
I Jurors are conventionally told that "the judge determines the law to be applied in the
case while the jury decides the facts," Handbook for Jurors Serving in the United States
District Courts (Judicial Conference of the United States 1959), reprinted in 26 F.R.D.
545, 549 (1961). However, in almost every litigated controversy, a multitude of fact ques-
tions must be determined by the judge. Frequently, decisions concerning the admissibility
of evidence require preliminary fact findings by the judge. See, e.g., Maguire & Epstein,
"Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence," 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 392 (1927). Moreover, although denominated "questions of law" to indicate that
they are decided by the judge, certain fact questions directly at issue in a case, for example,
questions of the construction of written documents, traditionally have been reserved to the
judge. See Devlin, Trial by Jury 61-125, especially at 103 (1956) ("empirical division be-
tween fact and law"); Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 202 (1898).
2 Compare Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection
56-58 (1956), with 1 Ekel~f, Ritteging 91 (Stockholm 1957).
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did not diminish popular preference for the traditional systems. Today,
despite domestic criticism and curtailed resort to similar systems abroad,3
lay participation in the judicial process, albeit in substantially different
forms, continues to be an enduring characteristic of the administration of
justice in both Sweden and the United States.
When community representatives participate in the hearing and adju-
dication of civil controversies, 4 the problem of evolving appropriate
standards of supervision and control for the trial judge has two principal
focal points: the relationship of the judge to the parties and the relation-
ship of the judge to the lay associates with whom he shares responsibility
for the outcome of the case. In this paper, attention will be given to
the latter point, with particular reference to the role of the Swedish
judge who occupies the dominant position both at the hearing and during
the deliberations, and to that of the American judge whose influence is
considerably less pervasive.
Preliminarily, a brief account will be given of the origins of the
common law jury and the Swedish n~dmnd and of the methods by which
jurors and niimndem~in are selected. Thereafter, the discussion will be
centered on the different ways in which the lay mind complements that
of the trained jurist in the United States and in Sweden.
I. THE OGIN OF TM JURY SYSTEM
A. The British Jury
The jury originated in medieval England as a device used by the
Norman kings to obtain information needed for administrative purposes.
Jurors were men of the neighborhood summoned before the King's
coroner to declare upon their oath what they knew of a matter under
investigation. Use of the jury as an instrument for the administration
of justice commenced in the latter half of the twelfth century. By royal
ordinance, a landholder whose title was challenged could, in lieu of
trial by battle, elect to have the controversy resolved by a jury. The
jury consisted of twelve neighbors sworn to declare, upon personal
knowledge, which of the two disputants had the better right to the
land. Early in the thirteenth century, when the Church withdrew its
approbation of trial by ordeal as a method of determining guilt or inno-
cence, English judges, lacking recourse to a developed body of legal
3 See Devlin, supra note 1, at 129-33; Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 74-75 (decline in facili-
ties and demand for jury trial in England); 1 Ekel6f, supra note 2, at 104-05.
4 Although the discussion in this paper will concentrate on civil proceedings, in describing
the functions of the ntimnd and the jury, some reference will be made to procedure in
criminal cases. See particularly note 63 infra.
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rules and procedures, turned to the jury as an available means of
resolving both criminal and civil actions.
Through an evolutionary process, occasionally aided by legislation
but for the most part uncharted by landmark events, the jury was trans-
formed from a body acting upon its own knowledge to one enjoined to
exclude from its consideration information obtained outside the court-
room. Similarly, the law-fact separation of authority between judge and
jury developed without pilot legislative or judicial pronouncement.
B. The Jury in the United States
When the jury was imported to America by the British colonists,
tradition and case law had established the essential characteristics of
the system. The jury was to consist of twelve impartial persons drawn
indiscriminately from the freemen of the neighborhood. Guided by the
judge's instructions as to the law and his advisory comments as to the
relevance and value of the evidence, jurors were to deliberate in camera
until they reached a unanimous verdict or reported themselves hope-
lessly deadlocked. Jury verdicts had to take the form of categorical
responses to the questions submitted by the judge; jurors had neither
the obligation nor the right to furnish reasons explaining the basis of
their responses. 5
The United States itself as well as each of the fifty states of the
United States has its own court structure and its own procedural system.6
In the federal courts trial by jury, in both criminal and civil actions,
follows the pattern established in England and employed in this country
5 This brief summary of the origin and development of -trial by jury is based upon the
more elaborate and precise historical accounts contained in 1 Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 312-50 (rev. ed. 1956); Maitland, The Constitutional History of England,
120-32 (1908); Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 104-31 (4th ed. 1948);
Thayer, supra note 1, at 47-182 (1898). These sources also describe the evolution of the
grand jury as a procedural device for presenting criminals, a subject which will not be
examined in this paper. For reference to other source material concerning the origin of
trial by jury, see Klein, "Bibliography," prepared for The Jury System in the Federal
Courts, Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the jury System
(1960), in 26 F.R.D. 409, 525, 534 (1961).
Consideration of the separate provinces of law and equity and the traditional but still
troublesome limitation of -the right of trial by jury to claims cognizable in actions at law
exceeds the scope of this discussion. For historical accounts of the development of the
complementary systems of law and equity, see 1 Holdsworth, supra at 395-476; Plucknett,
supra at 168-88. A review of some of the problems that have survived the abolition of
separate courts of law and equity and the advent of a unitary form of civil action appears
in 5 Moore, Federal Practice fffT 39.12, 39.13 (2d ed. 1951, Supp. 1961); Note, The Right
to a Nonjury Trial, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1176 (1961).
6 The allocation of judicial business between the state courts and the federal courts is a
matter of some complexity: some claims are cognizable only by the federal courts; others
only by the state courts; still others by either federal or state courts. For a review of the
principles and rules determining the respective provinces of the state and federal courts,
see 1 Moore, Federal Practice 1111 0.6, 0.7 (2d ed. 1961); IA id. 0.201, 0.202. See also Hart,
"The Relations Between State and Federal Law," 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1954).
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at the time the Federal Constitution was adopted. In the state courts
state constitutional and legislative provisions established the applicable
rules as to trial by jury. While the states are free to adopt innovations
respecting the use of juries and, although none of them have done so,
may even dispense with jury trials altogether, state procedure must
conform to standards of fairness demanded by the provision of the
Federal Constitution that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."7
II. THE ORIGIN OF THm N r SYSTEM
During its early history, Sweden was composed of a number of essen-
tially independent communities, each governed by a popular assembly
known as the ting. The ting exercised both legislative and judicial
authority, rendering decisions on all aspects of life and work in the com-
munity. At judicial sessions occurring before the ting, a contending party
took the required form of oath and stated his claim or defense in ac-
cordance with a prescribed formula, often calling oath helpers (edg~irds-
mdn) to vouch for his position. When the customary rules of the local
legal order so permitted or required, fact witnesses might also be heard.
The applicable law was declared, at first from memory and later from
written compilations, by a ting leader who functioned as presiding judge.
Finally, applying the law as declared by the ting leader, the men gathered
at the assembly determined the outcome of the controversy.'
In the thirteenth century, a method of determining disputes on the
basis of oral reports made to the ting by a board of community residents
known as a ndmnd began to assume increasing importance. Originally,
the n~dmnd consisted of twelve men of the community, six of them chosen
by each party, charged with the duty to investigate and report to the
ting facts within their personal knowledge acquired either prior to, or in
the course of their investigation. In time, the nhimnd became a permanent
institution composed of the same group of community representatives
holding regular sessions at which witnesses were heard and evidence
7 See U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2; amend. VI, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-90(1930) (criminal cases in federal courts); amend. VII, Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (civil cases in federal courts); amend. XIV, Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (state "due process" clause). See generally Busch, Law and Tactics in
Jury Trials §§ 16-50 (1949). For a sample of the problems created by dissimilar federal
and state court rules concerning jury trials when a claim based upon federal substantive law
is presented in a state court or, conversely, when a claim based upon state substantive law
is presented in a federal court, compare Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952),
with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See also Note, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 1516 (1953).8 For further details concerning the administration of justice in Sweden during the early
medieval period, see Engelmann & Millar, A History of Continental Civil Procedure 203-24
(1927); The Law of the Westgoths 7-15 (Bergin introd. 1906); Andersson, "Early Demo-
cratic Traditions in Scandinavia," Scandinavian Democracy 71-78 (Lauwerys ed. 1958).
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examined. Instructed and guided by the leader of the ting, the nimnd
began to determine controversies outside the assembly. Initially, the joint
decision of the n~imud and the ting leader who served as judge were
submitted to the men of the assembly for ratification. By the beginning
of the seventeenth century, however, in most of Sweden's provinces and
districts, the nimud and the judge had emerged as a wholly independent
tribunal-the district court (hiradsr~itten)-which exercised in full the
former judicial authority of the ting.9
Thus, the ndimnd and the jury originated as similar institutions.'0
Initially both were composed of community representatives impanelled
for a particular case to serve as fact witnesses rather than as triers. As
the systems developed, however, fundamental differences emerged.
NMimnd commissions became long-term assignments, while jurors con-
tinued to serve for brief periods. The jury, although obliged to accept
the legal rules as declared by the judge, became the exclusive trier of
the factual issues in a case." In contradistinction, the nimud acquired
competence to consider legal as well as factual issues but, with respect
to both kinds of questions, ndimndem~in performed their functions to-
gether with and, collectively, as partner of the presiding judge.' 2
The participation of ndimndemdn has been traditional in Sweden's
district courts (hiradsr~itter), the courts of first instance for rural and
smaller urban areas. However, the city courts (rdhusrdtter), courts of
first instance for larger urban areas, historically have had collegiate
professional benches. The city courts, still financed by the municipal
units rather than by the state, succeeded to the judicial authority of
the medieval town councils. Unlike district court judges, who are
members of a national judicial civil service, city court judges, at least
since the early part of the eighteenth century, have been nominees of
the municipal representative councils. The control by the citizens of
urban communities over the selection of their own judges may account
for the absence of popular demand in the cities for an institution corre-
sponding to the ndmnd.' 3
Today, the use of a single judge and a ndmnd in both civil and
9 For brief historical accounts of the origin of the nhdmnd, see Engehmann & Millar, supra
note 8, at 224-32; Munktell, Det Svenska R~ittsarvet 80-93 (1943).
10 It appears that neither institution was the model for or affected the development of
the other. See Plucknett, supra note 5, at 105-06.
"1 But cf. note 1 supra.12 The precise stages of the metamorphosis of the nimnd from a method of proof to a
trier of fact and law are uncertain. Nor is it clear whether the n~imnd became competent to
share in the adjudication of questions of law at the same time as it acquired competence
to participate in the determination of questions of fact. See Engelmann & Millar, supra
note 8, at 836-37; Munktell, supra note 9, at 86-87.
-3 1 Ekelf, supra note 2, at 91; Engelmann & Millar, supra note 8, at 838-39.
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criminal cases remains characteristic of Sweden's district courts. 4 In
civil cases the historic three judge composition of the city courts has
been preserved. 15 In criminal cases, however, as a result of an inno-
vation in Sweden's Code of Judicial Procedure of 1948, the city court
bench, like that of the district court, consists of a single judge sitting with-
out a ndmnd for petty offenses, a judge and a ndmnd of three for lesser
offenses as to which imprisonment is within the range of possible sanc-
tions, and a full ndmnd of seven to nine members for major offenses.' 6
III. THE SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT OF JURORS
The recruitment of laymen representing a cross-section of the various
social and economic groups of the community is the principal purpose
of the various devices employed in the United States for the selection
of jurors. Intentional exclusion from jury lists for the federal or state
courts of any class of persons solely on the basis of race or color runs
afoul of the "due process" guarantee of the Federal Constitution. Apart
from "due process" limitations, however, each state is free to determine
for itself both the sources of names of qualified persons and the methods
of selecting jurors from among those listed as qualified. 7
The following summary, although based on the rules and practices of
jury selection in the federal courts, fairly describes the rules generally
prevailing in the United States.
Any citizen who has attained the age of twenty-one and has resided
within a judicial district for a period of one year is eligible for jury
service within the district provided that he meets certain literacy, mental,
and physical health requirements and has not been convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.18 In each
district, staff officers of the court establish and periodically revise lists
of qualified persons from sources such as voting rosters, telephone
directories, tax rolls, association membership lists, and recommendations
14 Ritteg~ngsbalk (RB) [Code of Judicial Procedure, effective January 1, 1948] 1:4.
5 RB 1:11.
16 RB 1:4, 5 (district courts); RB 1:11, 12 (city courts).
juries specially impanelled for particular litigation and permitted to deliberate in camera
are used in Sweden only in press libel cases. For a description of Sweden's sweeping consti-
tutional guarantee of a free press and the special procedure applicable in press libel cases, see
Eek, "Protection of News Sources by the Constitution," 5 Scandinavian Studies in Law 18
(Schmidt ed. 1961).
37 See text at notes 6-7 supra; The jury System in the Federal Courts, supra note 5, 26
F.R.D. at 425-31, and cases cited therein; see also 18 U.S.C. § 243 (rendering exclusion of
jurors in any court of the United States or of any state on account of race or color a
criminal offense). Compare Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), with Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (economic screening, although invalid in federal court jury
selection, may be permitted in state court jury selection). With respect to exemptions granted
to women, see Hoyt v. United States, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Rudolph, "Women on Juries-
Voluntary or Compulsory," 44 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 206 (1961).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1861; cf. Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 62-67.
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of community leaders. 19 For good cause, any person or class of persons
may be excluded or excused by the court.20 The use of volunteers for
jury service, although not prohibited, is viewed with disfavor. 1
At regular intervals during the court's term, the names of persons to
be summoned for jury duty are publicly drawn from a box containing
the names of citizens who have been listed as qualified. In most districts,
thirty-five to seventy-five persons are summoned simultaneously. Before
the commencement of a trial, the panel to be seated in the jury box
is selected, again by lot, from among those summoned for jury duty.22
Questions are addressed to the prospective panel members, generally by
the judge, to make certain that each of them is qualified and impartial.
The parties may challenge any juror "for cause," that is, upon grounds
of partiality or lack of qualification. In addition, each party may exercise
three peremptory challenges for which no reason need be assigned.23 The
group finally impanelled must include twelve regular jurors and may
include up to two alternates.2
In approximately half of the federal districts, two to three weeks is
generally the maximum period for jury service.25 If the trial to which
a juror is assigned is concluded before his term expires, the juror may be
assigned to another trial. If a protracted trial is anticipated, prospective
jurors are generally given some estimate of its length so that they can
advise the court of any undue hardship or extreme inconvenience war-
ranting excuse from service.
Jurors receive a per diem fee, generally regarded as token payment
for the performance of a patriotic duty rather than as reasonable compen-
sation for time served. An allowance for transportation to and from
29 See The Jury System in the Federal Courts, supra note 5, 26 F.R.D. at 469-79. See also
United States v. Greenbergi 200 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1863. Classes of persons normally excused include physicians, school teachers
during the school term, pharmacists, funeral directors, and lawyers in active practice. See
The Jury System in the Federal Courts, supra note 5, 26 F.R.D. at 443-45, 453-54. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (exemption for members of the armed forces, fire and police depart-
ment employees, and public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of
federal, state, or territorial governments).
21 The possibility of political or economic motives has rendered the so-called "professional
juror" somewhat suspect. See The Jury System in the Federal Courts, supra note 5, 26 F.RD.
at 431-32. At the request of either party, a prospective juror will be excused if he has served
as a juror at the court within a year of the date of trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1869.
22 28 U.S.C. §§ 1864, 1867; see The Jury System in the Federal Courts, supra note 5, 26
F.R.D at 479-81.
23 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(a), Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a) (authorizing the judge to conduct
the "voir dire" examination or to allow the attorneys or the parties to do so); Vanderbilt,
supra note 2, at 73 (variant state practices); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (three peremptory chal-
lenges in civil cases); Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b) (peremptory challenges in criminal cases).
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(b) (one or two alternates in civil cases); Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)
(up to four alternates in criminal cases).
25 See The jury System in the Federal Courts, supra note 5, 26 F.R.D. at 485.
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the court and a subsistence fee, paid to jurors required to remain in the
vicinity of the court overnight, are also authorized.26
IV. THE SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT OF NXMNDEMXN
A full ndmnd panel, under the currently effective procedural rules,
consists of at least seven but not more than nine members. Sweden's
Code of Judicial Procedure requires the designation of at least eighteen
nbimndemin, in other words, two complete ndmnd panels, for each of the
district courts. Authority to increase the number of lay representatives
when an increase in the population or in the judicial business of a district
so warrants resides in the cabinet. The cabinet also has authority to
determine the number of niimndemiin for each of the city courts.
Ndmndemin are elected for six year terms by the district and city
representative councils"' from the roster of eligible local citizens-male
and female residents over twenty-five years of age, financially solvent,
and not employed as professional judges, prosecutors or policemen or
engaged in the representation of private litigants in judicial proceedings.
Because service on the n~imnd is considered a public duty as well as an
honor, the right to decline designation by the local representative council
or to relinquish an accepted commission is limited: Members who have
served for two years or persons who have attained the age of sixty are
entitled to exemption; others may be released by the court only upon
showing good cause.30 Elections take place as vacancies occur." Most
n~imndemin are re-elected for consecutive terms, and it is not uncommon
for members to retain their positions for more than twenty years.
Ndmndem~in elected by the local councils are divided by the court
into panels of seven to nine members.2 Generally, each panel sits for
one full day every second week during the term of court. Depending
upon the length of trial proceedings and the condition of the court
calendar, however, the same panel may be required to sit for several
26 28 U.S.C. § 1871 ($7 per diem fee; 10 cents per mile transportation allowance; $7
per day subsistence payment).
27 RB 1:5, 12.
28 RB 4:5. Members of the representative council are popularly elected by citizens regis-
tered in the community served by the council. Kommunallagen, December 18, 1953, 1953
Svensk Fbrfattningssamlng (SFS) 753, § 6. Council members are designated pursuant to
a system of proportional representation; ngimndemun are elected by majority vote. See 1
Ekelif, supra note 2, at 68.
29 RB 4:6 para. 1. The court is required to examine the qualifications of elected ngimnd
representatives on its own initiative. However, the validity of the election procedure is notjudicially examined in the absence of a specific challenge thereto by a person entitled to
vote for members of the representative council. RB 4:7.
30 RB 4:6 para. 2; 4:8.
31 RE 4:5 para. 4.
32 RB 1:5, 12.
[Vol. 48
THE JURY AND THE NAMND
consecutive days, weeks, or even months 8 Nmndeman are not salaried
officers. Like jurors, they receive a per diem payment and a food and
board allowance for periods of attendance at court; they are also reim-
bursed for travel expenses."4
When a panel member is unable to attend a proceeding or is disqual-
ified from participating in a particular case, 5 the court, if it fails to
find a substitute among the other regular ndmndem~in, may appoint
as a temporary member a local citizen who meets the eligibility require-
ments for election to the nlimnd.86
V. THE DISTRBuTION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE AND JURY
Whether the judge presiding at a jury trial should function as "governor
of the trial" or merely as referee of an adversary contest has been a
favored topic of discussion among lawyers and legal scholars in the
United States37 In many of the states, legislative limitations have
resolved the issue for the judge by depriving him of the power to assume
the dominant role." In the federal courts and in the courts of some
of the states, however, the common law concept of the position and
authority of the judge has not been subjected to legislative diminution;
in his relationship to the jury, the judge in these courts has a variety
of control devices at his command. In this section, consideration will be
given to some of the control devices available to the judge, as reflected
in the procedural rules and practices applicable in the federal courts,
and to some of the factors affecting his determination whether to use
them.
33 RB 1:5 para. 2; 1:12 para. 3; 1:15.
34 The per diem payment is $9 (45 kronor) per day of travel and court attendance. Food
and board allowance varies from $4-8 per day. See Kungl. Kung5relse (KK) April'30, 1953,
as amended, in 1961 Sveriges Rikes Lag (SRL) at p. 1049, concerning the nuhnndeman's
daily wage and allowances for travel, food, and board.35 NYlindemlin are subject to the same rules of disqualification as those applicable to
judges. See RB 4:12-15 (relation to parties or subject matter, personal bias or prejudice,
conflict of interests).
83 RB 4:10; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(a) (summoning of talesmen from bystanders when
sufficient jurors are not available).37 See, e.g., Vanderbilt, supra note 2; Wyzanski, "A Trial Judge's Freedom and Respon-
sibility," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1952).
8 Today, the relationship between judge and jury in the United States accords substan-
tially with the principles developed during the nineteenth century. In the federal courts and
in roughly one quarter of the states, the common law power of the judge to advise and
guide the jury has not been curtailed by legislation. In most states, legislative injunctions
against judicial expressions of opinion as to the strength or value of the evidence are
operative. A sizeable minority of the states leave the task of presenting and summarizing the
respective contentions of the parties entirely in the hands of the attorneys, confining thejudge's function to rulings on evidence and unelaborated declarations to the jury of relevant
legal principles. For an account of the considerations leading the states to depart from the
common law distribution of functions among attorneys, judges and juries, see Pound,
"The Judicial Office in America," 10 B.U.L. Rev. 123 (1930). For a summary of current
state practices see Wright, "Instructions to the Jury: Summary Without Comment," 1954
Wash. U.L.Q. 177.
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A. Control Devices Available to the Judge
1. The Pre-trial Conference
To expedite the trial of an action, a federal judge may summon the
attorneys for the contending parties to a pre-trial conference. Conference
agendas may encompass items such as the disposition of undisputed
issues through admissions or stipulations, the resolution of threshold
questions through pre-trial judicial determinations, and the treatment of
evidentiary problems such as those relating to means of proving economic
or technical facts and methods of handling documentary evidence.39
Similar in design to the preparatory work that is a standard part
of the processing of a case in Sweden,40 the pre-trial conference can
effect a considerable saving of trial time and expense and facilitate
the presentation of a controversy to a jury in a clear and continuous
sequence. In so-called protracted cases, cases involving a multiplicity of
parties or complex economic or technical issues, a number of pre-trial
conferences, carefully planned by the judge and requiring extensive
advance preparation by the attorneys, are likely to occur.41 In ordinary
civil actions, there is seldom more than one pre-trial conference. De-
pending upon the degree of preparation of the judge and the attorneys,
a pre-trial conference in an ordinary civil action may be an effective
instrument in controlling the subsequent course of the action or it may
amount to little more than an informal discussion having scant effect
upon the trial.41
2. Separate Trials
"In furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice," the federal
judge, either upon his own initiative or upon the request of a party,
may order a separate trial of any claim or issue.43 Courts and legal
scholars generally agree upon the efficacy of separate trials in a variety
of situations, among them cases presenting threshold questions such as
the validity of a release or the application of a time bar to the plaintiff's
claim. However, there has been considerable controversy as to the
propriety of using the separate trial device to sever the issue of liability
from the issue of damages in accident cases. Proponents of severance
urge its advantages in simplifying and streamlining the presentation
39 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16; "Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases," 23 F.R.D.
319-634, especially at 328-34, 360-67, 412-26 (1959).
40 See text at notes 64-66 infra.
41 See Handbook of Recommended Practices for the Trial of Protracted Cases: Report
of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation (1960).
42 See Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, Part One: Pre-Trial Procedure
in Ordinary Civil Actions, 23 F.R.D. 319, 328-75 (1959).
43 Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 (b).
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of a case. Those who oppose severance fear that the procedure will
revitalize strict application of the legal doctrine denying any recovery
to a plaintiff who is not free from contributory fault-a doctrine cur-
rently discounted by the jury with the tacit approval of the trial judge.4"
3. Control over the Reception of Evidence
In almost every jury trial, the attorneys frequently call upon the
judge to apply elaborate rules of evidence designed to exclude from
the consideration of the jury irrelevant, remote, and prejudicial matters. 6
Beyond this, in his discretion, the judge may address questions to the
witnesses during or after the examinations conducted by the attorneys
and may suggest to the parties, out of the hearing of the jury, the advis-
ability of calling additional witnesses or submitting additional docu-
mentary proof. Although in theory the judge may call a witness on his
own initiative, this form of judicial intervention seldom occurs in a
jury trial.46
4. Directed Verdicts
If, after hearing the evidence and upon application by a party, the
judge finds that reason will tolerate only one result, he has authority to
"direct a verdict," that is, to refuse to submit the case to the jury at
all and to direct the entry of judgment in accordance with his finding.
In practice, because the standards to be employed in determining whether
to direct a verdict are somewhat elusive, the judge will usually prefer to
defer his decision until the jury has reported its conclusion. In most
cases, the jury verdict will obviate the necessity for a judicial ruling
on the matter. In cases in which the jury verdict does not have this
result, the judge may disregard the verdict and direct the entry of a
contrary judgment.4 7
5. Instructions to the Jury
The determination of a civil controversy has been described as a
three-fold process: identification of the relevant facts, declaration of
44 Compare Zeisel, "The jury and the Court Delay," 328 Annals 46, 51-52 (1960), with
Weinstein, "Routine Bifurcation of jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable
Use of Rule Making Power," 14 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (1961). See text at note 57 infra; cf.
Grinfors, "Apportionment of Damages in the Swedish Law of Torts," 1 Scandinavian
Studies in Law 93 (Schmidt ed. 1,957) (contributory fault reduces but does not bar a
recovery).
45 See James, "Sufficiency of the Evidence and jury-Control Devices Available Before
Verdict," 47 Va. L. Rev. 218, 228-31 (1961).
40 See Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 6-7; Wyzanski, supra note 37, at 1283-90; cf.
McCormick, Evidence 533-36 (1954) (counseling against comment on nonproduction of
evidence in the absence of special circumstances). But cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
46, 84 (1948) (dissenting opinion) (trial judge has an obligation to call and examine wit-
nesses if necessary to elicit the truth "particularly in a case where he himself is trier of the
facts").
47 Fed. R. Civ. P. g0; James, supra note 45, at 232-35.
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the relevant legal rules and principles, and application of the declared
rules and principles to the identified facts. In jury trials, fact identifi-
cation is the responsibility of the jury, while law declaration is the
responsibility of the judge. The third function, law application, although
generally performed by the jury, may be narrowed or broadened by the
judge depending upon the generality or specificity of his instructions. 8
In the federal courts, the judge speaks last; his charge to the jury
is made after counsel have completed their summations. In his in-
structions, the judge generally summarizes the disputed issues, the
respective contentions of the parties, the evidence adduced at trial,
and the governing legal doctrines. He may also comment on the evidence,
indicating dispassionately his opinions as to the value and reliability
of particular items of proof. In undertaking this type of analysis, how-
ever, the judge must make it clear to the jury that they are not bound
to follow his view of the facts or of the credibility of witnesses.4
Instructions presented in one dose and only at the end of the trial,
however carefully phrased, often fail to accomplish their intended
purpose. Lacking education in law or experience in court procedure,
jurors may be unable to comprehend or apply the legal concepts outlined
by the judge.50 Particularly in lengthy or complex cases, judges have
been urged to instruct continuously throughout the trial-to outline the
issues at the commencement of the proceeding and to advise the jury
as to the purpose and significance of the evidence at the time it is intro-
duced.8' The distribution of written copies of the judge's instructions
for use during jury deliberations has also been proposed as a means of
reducing the risk of confusion and misunderstanding. 2 In practice,
however, particularly in the courts in which case loads are heaviest,
judges seldom have sufficient time in advance of trial to engage in the
extensive preparation necessary for effective utilization of these methods
of clarification.
6. Forms of Verdict
In addition to the choice between explicit and general instructions,
the judge may control the bounds within which the jury functions through
the form of verdict that he requires them to return. A federal judge has
discretion to select one of three forms of verdict: the general verdict,
48 See Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process 373-80 (tentative ed. 1958).
49 See James, supra note 45, at 235-37; cf. id. at 237-41 (variant state practices).
50 See Frank, Courts on Trial 116 (1949).
51 See United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1956).
52 Recommendation & Study Relating to Taking Instructions to the Jury Room (Cal.
Law Rev. Comm'n 1956); Wyzanski, supra note 37, at 1289. But see Broeder, "The Uni-
versity of Chicago Jury Project," 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744, 750-51 (1959).
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the special verdict, and the general verdict accompanied by answers to
interrogatories. The general verdict is an unelaborated finding for the
plaintiff or for the defendant. In returning such a verdict the jury is
called upon to determine the facts, apply the law, and announce only its
ultimate conclusion as to the disposition of the action. The special
verdict consists of a series of categorical answers to questions framed by
the judge defining the disputed factual issues. It is a device used to
limit the province of the jury to fact identification and to reserve for the
judge the function of law application. The intermediate form of jury sub-
mission, the general verdict accompanied by interrogatories, permits the
jury to return its ultimate conclusion as to the outcome of the case, but
also requires it to focus attention on the key issues and to report
specifically its findings thereon. If the answers to the interrogatories
cannot be reconciled with each other or with the ultimate conclusion, at
least two courses are available to the judge: He may explain the incon-
sistencies, and request that the jury deliberate further or he may order
a new trial. If the answers to the interrogatories are consistent with each
other but one or more is inconsistent with the ultimate conclusion, the
judge has an additional alternative: He may disregard the ultimate
conclusion and enter judgment in accordance with the answers, in effect,
treating the jury's responses as a special verdict.5 3
7. New Trials
If the judge determines that the jury verdict is "contrary to the
weight of the evidence," he may decline to enter judgment on the verdict
and, instead, order a new trial. 4 In determining whether a verdict is
"contrary to the weight of the evidence," the judge takes into account
his own impressions of the credibility of witnesses to a greater extent
than he does in determining whether to direct a verdict. However, he
may not properly put himself in the place of a thirteenth juror, exercising
a veto power over the verdict merely because he would have reached an
opposite conclusion.
As in the case of the standards for directing a verdict, the standards
for deciding when a verdict is "contrary to the weight of the evidence"
are not susceptible of precise definition. Among the variables that may
enter into the determination are the length and complexity of the trial
and the familiarity of laymen with the subject matter of the controversy. 5
53 Fed. R. Civ. P. 49; see James, supra note 45, at 242-48. Compare Morris v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 187 F.2d 837, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1951), with id., 187 F.2d at 843-44 (concurring
opinion).
54 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
55 See James, supra note 45, at 218-27.
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8. Remittitur
If the judge finds that the evidence supports the conclusion of the
jury as to liability but does not warrant imposition of the full amount
of damages indicated by the verdict he may grant a remittitur, that is,
he may pare down the monetary award, specifying that if the plaintiff
declines to accept the reduced sum a new trial will be directed, either
of the entire claim or of the issue of damages. If the judge finds that
the amount of damages awarded by the jury is inadequate, however, he
does not have authority to require the defendant to choose between an
increased sum or a new trial. In this situation, if the judge is unwilling
to enter judgment on the verdict, his order directing a new trial of the
claim must be unconditional."o
B. The Role of the Judge in a Civil Jury Trial: Governor or Referee
Normally, the type of case presented for adjudication is the principal
determinant of the extent to which the federal trial court judge will
utilize his powers to guide and control the jury. Leaving to one side
variations arising from the special features of particular cases, a judge
will generally regard his function in commercial disputes as substantially
different in character from his function in tort litigation.
In most commercial situations, prevailing legal rules and standards
operate as guides to private action. When controversies arise, the judge,
cognizant of the importance to the business community of uniform and
predictable results and of the difficulty faced by the average juror in
dealing with unfamiliar and often complex or technical issues, will incline
toward full exercise of his supervisory powers.
On the other hand, the encounters that form the basis of most tort
claims occur without reference to possible legal consequences. Because
private activity in this area is less frequently motivated by the expec-
tation that certain legal principles will apply, the need for uniform
results is less urgent. Moreover, as to questions of liability turning upon
standards of reasonable or moral behavior and as to questions of damages
for intangible items such as pain and suffering, the generality of the
legal measuring rod invites individualized common sense judgments.
Finally, with respect to the stream of accident cases brought to the
courts, the avoidance of meticulous judicial guidance has served a special
purpose. For some time, many lawyers, legal scholars, and judges have
56 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (required practice in federal courts under
seventh amendment); cf. Napolitano v. New York Cent. R.R., Civ. No. 143-190, S.D.N.Y.,
April 11, 1961, May 1, 1961.
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shared the view that the traditional legal principles, predicating liability
upon fault and the right to recover damages upon freedom from con-
tributory fault, are no longer consonant with prevailing community
opinions of justice. Instead of encouraging a result reflective of the
traditional principles, judges may prefer to facilitate a resolution that
accords with popular notions of fairness by relaxing their efforts to direct
the jury along the time-worn legal path.5 7
VI. THE JOINT AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGE
AND THE NAimND
In Sweden, although the 1948 Code of Judicial Procedure looks toward
increased procedural activity on the part of the litigants or their repre-
sentatives, the judge, in his relationship to the parties as well as to the
niimnd, remains the "governor of the trial." With respect to the presen-
tation of evidence, the judge has discretion to permit the examination-in-
chief and cross-examination of witnesses by the parties or their represen-
tatives or to reserve to himself the role of principal interrogator."
With respect to the decision of a controversy, the judge has the con-
trolling voice: The opinion of the ndmnd will not prevail over the con-
trary opinion of the judge unless at least seven nimndemlin agree upon
both the decision and the rationale therefor."9
Because the ndmnd deliberates with the judge, taking part in the
decision of questions of law as well as of fact, there are few parallels
in Swedish procedure to the formal control devices available to the
federal judge presiding at a jury trial in the United States. Instead,
flexibility and informality characterize the cooperative effort of the
judge and the ndmnd. Moreover, at the pre-trial stage, before lay triers
are summoned to serve on the court, the two systems reflect differences
in approach.
1. The Preparatory Stage and the Main Hearing
Swedish judicial proceedings are generally divided into two distinct
parts: the preparatory stage (f6rberedelsen) and the main hearing
57 For comprehensive treatment of the manner in which the nature of the controversy
affects the function of the trial judge, see Wyzanski, supra note 37. See also James, supra
note 45, at 244-48; 1 Ekelf, Riittegng 97 (Stockholm 1957).
58 RB 36:17. It was the intention of the drafters of Sweden's 1948 Code of Judicial
Procedure that, as attorneys and judges acquired experience under the revised procedural
system, questioning of witnesses would be entrusted primarily to the attorneys. See Brodin,
"En advokats funderingar 6ver domaruppgifterna i den muntliga processen," 1962 Tidskrift
f6r Sveriges Advokatsamfund 192; Ggrde, Engstrmer, Strandberg & Sbderlund, Nya
Rittegangsbalken 509 (1949).
59 RB 16:3 para. 1 (district courts); 29:3 para. 1 (city courts). But cf. Administration
of Justice in Norway: The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice 34, 41 (1957) (the vote
of each Norwegian lay judge has the same weight as that of the presiding professional
judge).
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(huvudfiSrhandlingen). During the preparatory stage, preliminary ob-
jections are entertained and, after disclosure by the parties of their
respective positions, the order and scope of the main hearing are
established.
In both the district and city courts, a single judge unassisted by
niimndemin presides at the preparatory stage.60 Main hearings in civil
cases occur in the district court before a judge and a ndmnd of seven to
nine members6 and in the city court before a bench of three or four
professional judges.62 At main hearings in criminal cases, a n~dmnd is
used in the city court as well as in the district court.6
Normally, matters urged during the course of the preparatory work
may not form the basis of the ultimate disposition of a claim; as a gen-
eral rule, final judgment upon the merits must be predicated exclusively
upon testimony and other evidence adduced at the main hearing.64
However, in almost every case, at the conclusion of the preparatory stage,
the dimensions of the main hearing-the evidence and arguments urged
by the contending parties in support of each of the disputed issues-will
be outlined with a fair degree of precision.
In sum, in the ordinary civil action, pre-trial preparation under the
direct supervision of the judge is generally more extensive in Swedish
courts than in courts of the United States. 5 On the other hand, Swedish
procedure does not offer to the litigant the pre-trial discovery devices
60 Participation of nllmndem4n at the preparatory stage is required only when the court
conducts a view of the locus in quo (syn . st' llet). When such a view is taken in lower
court criminal proceedings or in district court civil proceedings, a ngmnd of three may be
used. RB 1:4, 5, 12.
Often, the judge presiding at the preparatory stage will also preside at the main hearing.
See Lagergren, "The Preparatory Proceeding and the Hearing-in-Chief," 82 Ir. L.T. 165,
166 (1948).61 RB 1:4. In specified classes of cases, the main hearing may occur before a judge and
a n~imnd of three and in others, by a judge sitting without a nlimnd.
62 RE 1:11.
63 RB 1:4, 5 (district courts) ; 11, 12 (city courts).
As originally promulgated, the 1948 Code of Judicial Procedure required the use of
nimndemin in city courts only for crimes punishable by two years or more at hard labor.
See 1943 Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv (NJA) II, 22. An amendment effective January 1, 1959(Lag of June 10, 1958) prescribed the present uniform composition of the district court
and the city court in criminal cases. Certain lesser offenses may be tried by a judge sitting
without a ndmnd and others, by a judge and a nimnd of three. Major offenses must be
tried before a judge and a full nhmnd of seven to nine members. Compare RB 1:4 with RB
1:11.
In criminal cases, the niimnd participates in the decision as to the appropriate punish-
ment as well as in the determination of guilt or innocence. See 1 Ekel6f, supra note 57 at 97,
99, 103; cf. Wyzanski, supra note 37, at 1290-93 (sentencing is the exclusive and most
important function of the federal judge in criminal jury trials).
64 RB 17:2; 30:2. But see RB 42:18, 20 (decisions in specified classes of cases may be
made during the preparatory stage or at a main hearing held in "immediate conjunction"
with the preparatory work by a judge sitting without a nimnd). See Lagergren, supra note
60, at 165-66.
65 See text at note 42 supra.
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through which a litigant in the United States, largely without court
intervention, may obtain information as to his opponent's case. c°
2. The Order of Trial and the Reception of Evidence
The authority of the Swedish judge to order separate preparation or
hearing of one or more of the issues presented for adjudication is
similar to that of his counterpart in the courts of the United States. 7
As to the receipt of evidence, formal exclusionary rules no longer
limit the items of proof that may be submitted to a Swedish court. The
judge has discretion to accept any relevant material and look to any
relevant source that might assist the court in eliciting the truth.,, Be-
cause formal restraints on the receipt and evaluation of evidence are
not operative, the obligation of the judge to clarify for the ndmnd his
views of the value and strength of the various items of proof is of
particular importance.
3. "Instructing" the Nimnd
Because the ndimnd participates in the determination of all questions
presented, the judge does not deliver a formal charge delineating the
authority of the lay triers and the principles and rules pursuant to
which it should be exercised. During deliberations, the judge and the
members of the n~imnd have equal freedom to express their opinions
and observations. However, the judge has a duty to clarify for his lay
partners the essential issues of the case and the applicable legal considera-
tions so that irrelevant matters and popular misconceptions will not
obscure the judgment of the n~imndem~in.
Constant association in a cooperative effort carries with it the danger
of direct conflicts between the judge and the lay triers, a danger that is
absent in a jury system premised on divided responsibility. To achieve
the proper balance, the judge must explain the relevant legal concepts in
a manner comprehensible to the ndmnd, but he must also evaluate and
comment with care upon the questions and views of his lay partners.
In short, the effectiveness of the system depends upon the patience and
tolerance of the judge-he must command the respect of the niimndemiin
so that they will not ignore his guidance and, at the same time, he must
66 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-33, 36 (depositions, interrogatories, requests for admissions).
67 Compare RB 17:4, 5, with Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Cf. Orfield, The Growth of Scandi-
navian Law 288 (1953).
68 RB 35:1, 7; see Orfield, supra note 67, at 288-89. In accepting the principle of free
evaluation of evidence, Sweden followed the pattern established at the end of the nineteenth
century in the procedural codes of Germany and Austria. See Kaplan, von Mehren &
Schaefer, "Phases of German Civil Procedure I," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1244 (1958);
Lenhoff, "The Law of Evidence-A Comparative Study Based Essentially on Austrian and
New York Law," 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 313, 334 (1954).
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be willing to elaborate upon the diverse facets of each controversy so
that he may reap optimum benefit from the opinions of his lay associ-
ates.69
4. Responsibility for Judgment on the Merits
Although in theory a decision supported by seven n~imndenin
prevails over the contrary opinion of the judge,70 in practice such
disagreements seldom occur. As to questions of liability turning upon
standard of reasonable or moral behavior and as to questions of
damages for intangible items such as pain and suffering, the views of the
ndmnd, like those of the jury, appear to be particularly valued by the
judge. On the other hand, as to questions arising in more complex or
technical areas of the law, the ndmnd is likely to defer to the views of
the judge.7 In addition to their respect for the education and training
of the judge, ndimndemin may be expected to take into account at
least two other factors. First, a decision in which the judge dissents may
not survive an appeal to the collegiate, wholly professional bench of
the court of second instance.72 Second, when the ndmnd overrides the
vote of the judge, the members who concurred in the decision will be
held personally accountable for the result if they failed to satisfy the
standards of good faith and diligence required of all those holding
positions of public trust in Sweden. 73
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a description rather than a critique of the relation-
ship between judge and lay triers in Sweden and the United States, two
countries in which laymen have traditionally participated in the adjudica-
tion of civil as well as criminal controversies. Both the n~imnd system
in Sweden and the jury system in the United States have displayed
remarkable qualities of endurance and, despite their critics, appear to
have grown more venerable with age.
The basic difference in the two systems is apparent: In Sweden, the
69 See 1 Ekeldf, supra note 57, 90-109.
70 See note 59 supra.
71 See note 69 supra.
With respect to tort litigation and Sweden's somewhat complex rules concerning apportion-
ment of damages, see Grinfors, supra note 44.
72 But cf. Administration of Justice in Norway: The Royal Norwegian Ministry of
Justice 40-41 (1957) (participation of lay judges in Norwegian appellate proceedings in
court's discretion or upon request of a party).
73 As to the liability of persons holding positions of public trust, see generally Herlitz,
"Swedish Administrative Law," 3 Scandinavian Studies in Law 87, 118-24 (1959); Jiger-
skibld, "The Swedish Ombudsman," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1077 (1961).
When the decision of the judge prevails, the members of the niimnd are not held respon-
sible for their votes. RB 16:7; 29:7. In such cases, dissenting views of panel members are
not even noted in the court record. RB 6:3 para. 8.
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power of decision does not reside in the hands of laymen only, while in
the United States laymen have exclusive authority with respect to the
questions assigned to them. In addition, because of the unique position
of the ndimndemdin, a further distinction, implicit in the first, may be
discerned.
Chosen for his general knowledge of community affairs and mores
rather than for his technical knowledge, the Swedish ndmndem~in,
serving a long term and publicly esteemed commission, 4 may be
described as a hybrid between the common law juror and the expert
lay member of a specialized tribunal. As a result of the length of the
niimndem~in's assignment, the staggered election system, and the,
practice of re-electing members for consecutive terms,", stability and
continuity have been characteristic of the lay influence in Sweden's
lower courts.
Past trial experiences of the ndmndemdin coupled with constant
guidance and control by the presiding judge provide a check against
disparate results in similar cases that rarely can be achieved in a jury
system in which lay triers serve for brief periods and do not share their
function with the judge.76 Thus in Sweden, a country that has never
adopted a formal rule of stare decisis, the method of trial by judge
and ndmnd tends to favor consistency at the stage of law application.
By contrast, in jury trials in the United States, although the declared
law must conform to the pronouncements of appellate tribunals, the
application of the law in particular cases may vary substantially.
SUMMARY
In both Sweden and the United States, laymen have traditionally
participated in the adjudication of civil as well as criminal controversies.
The role of the judge in directing civil proceedings in these countries
must be approached from two vantage points: the relationship of the
judge to the parties and the relationship of the judge to the laymen with
whom he shares responsibility for the outcome of the case. This paper
is concerned with the latter point; it compares the position of the
Swedish judge, who occupies the dominant position at the hearing and
during the deliberations, with that of the judge of a federal court in
the United States, whose authority is considerably less pervasive.
74 Nimndemin and professional judges take the same oath of office. See RB 4:11. The
title "FN-mndeman" is used as a form of address even outside the courtroom. The member
designated by the court to serve as chairman of the niimnd, generally the oldest and most
experienced lay representative, is addressed by the special title "hiiradsdomare," see 1
Ekelf, supra note 57, at 67, n.7.
75 See text at notes 28-31 supra.
76 But see text at note 53 (special verdicts). See also Hart & Sacks, supra note 48, at
370-80.
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The common law jury and the body of lay triers in Sweden, known
as the nimind, originated as similar institutions. Both were composed
of community representatives impanelled for a particular case to serve
as fact witnesses rather than as triers. As the systems developed, how-
ever, fundamental differences emerged. Ndmnd commissions became
long-term assignments while jurors continued to serve for brief periods.
The facts of a case and not the legal rules remained the subject of the
jury's concern but, within this sphere, the jury became the exclusive
trier. The ndmnd acquired competence to consider legal as well as
factual issues but, with respect to both kinds of questions, nmndemin
performed their functions together with and, collective, as partners of
the presiding judge.
Today, juries in the federal courts of the United States are composed
of twelve persons chosen at random from among the various economic
and social groups of the community. Seldom serving for more than two to
three weeks in any one year, jurors deliberate in camera, announcing
in open court only their ultimate and unanimous fact finding or
findings.
Members of the n~imnd are chosen for six year terms by the local
representative councils from among the local citizenry. Ndimdemin
sit in panels of seven to nine members and generally serve at two one-
day sessions each month. From the commencement of a hearing until a
decision has been reached, n~imndemlin remain with the judge. Moreover,
the judge has the principal voice in determining the result of the
litigation. The opinion of the nimnd will not prevail over the contrary
opinion of the judge unless at least seven nimndemin agree upon both
the decision and the rationale therefor.
In supervising the conduct of a jury trial, the judge has recourse to
a number of control devices. These include rulings on the admissibility
of evidence and instructions to the jury delineating the authority of the
lay triers and the manner in which it should be exercised. To avoid the
risk of misunderstanding or lack of comprehension, the judge may
submit written questions to the jury calling for categorical responses
with respect to each of the issues in the case. Further, the judge has
authority to enter judgment without referring the case to the jury
at all if he finds that reason will tolerate only one result, or to order
a new trial if he finds that the jury determination is contrary to the
weight of the evidence.
In practice, the extent to which the judge utilizes the control devices
available to him is largely dependent upon the type of case presented
for adjudication: In tort cases, the judge will be inclined to allow con-
[Vol. 48
THE JURY AND THE NAMND
siderable latitude for jury discretion; in commercial cases, he will
attempt to hold the jury by a tighter rein.
Because the n~imnd deliberates with the presiding judge, flexibility
and informality rather than formal control devices characterize the
relationship between the judge and the lay triers in Sweden. Constant
association in a cooperative effort carries with it the danger of direct
conflicts between the judge and the lay triers, a danger that is absent in
a jury system premised on divided responsibility. To achieve the proper
balance, the judge must clarify for his lay partners the essential issues
of the case and the applicable legal considerations, but he must also
evaluate and comment with care upon the questions and opinions of his
lay partners. In short, the effectiveness of the system depends upon the
tolerance and patience of the judge-he must command the respect of
the ndmndem~in so that they will heed his direction and, at the same
time, he must encourage expression of the observations of the ndmnd so
that he will reap optimum benefit from the views and reactions of his
lay associates.
Under the namnd system, past trial experiences of the laymen
coupled with constant guidance and control by the presiding judge
provide a check against disparate results in similar cases that rarely
can be achieved in a jury system in which lay triers serve for brief
periods and do not share their function with the judge. Thus, in
Sweden, a country that has never adopted a formal rule of stare decisis,
the method of trial by judge and nimnd tends to favor consistency at
the stage of law application. By contrast, in jury trials in the United
States, although the declared law must conform to the pronouncements of
appellate tribunals, the application of the law in particular cases may
vary substantially.
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